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Ancient Greeks used to say that the investigation of the meaning of words 
is the beginning of education.1 In that tradition any study of espionage in 
Byzantine writings should include the relevant terminology both in military 
and non-military context. This raises the question of the nature of the 
sources, be they military manuals, chronicles, letters, hagiographical or other 
texts, in which espionage-related terms occur, as well as of the sporadic or 
systematic character of such mentions. The fact that espionage stories in 
Byzantine sources were often hinted at rather than spelled out should also 
be taken into account.  The relevant terminology leads in turn to questions 
regarding the organization of Byzantine espionage and its link to strategies, 
military tactics, foreign relations and politics both in general and in the 
context of opposition to imperial policies. Examining examples of both 
subjects provides a general view of spies, espionage and their perception by 
the people of the time.  
A comprehensive picture of Byzantine espionage should take into 
account the thousand year history of the Empire and its neighbours, while 
accounting for changing circumstances within that timeframe. Also it 
should corroborate the findings from Greek Byzantine sources, on which 
this article is based, with relevant information from Latin, Arabic, Georgian, 
Slavic and other sources, dealing with espionage from the viewpoint of 
Byzantium’s neighbours.  Since such an endeavour lies outside the range of 
this small contribution, the present article will limit itself to some 
observations on espionage and its perception as encountered in Byzantine 
writings. 
With the exception of military manuals and historical sources 
systematically dealing with espionage within the particular context of 
specific military tactics, references to espionage and spies are random; a 
handicap in the study of Byzantine espionage. They tend to be found in 
stories on unrelated subjects, in the context of politics, foreign policy and 
strategy as well as relevant communications within the Empire and beyond, 
sometimes appearing only through inference, as a story within a story. In 
the latter case, we often dispose of some extraordinarily vivid scenes, 
                                                     
1 Epictet, Discourses 1.17.12. 




frequently adorned with fictional elements, which stand out as a kind of 
‘vignette’ in the narratives of chronicles and hagiographical texts. 
 
 
The Terminology of Byzantine Espionage 
 
Coming back to the meaning of words and espionage terminology, 
Byzantine spies were usually referred to by the common Greek word 
kataskopoi, spies. The word, one already used in ancient Greek, was based 
on the noun kataskopè which denoted ‘the action of assessing something in 
detail and from near distance’,2 hence to ‘spy’. The word is found used 
thus, 3 both by ancient Greek historians such as Thucydides in the 
Peloponnesian War and in Modern Greek. Byzantine military sources use the 
verbal form of the word kataskopein in relation to the duties of the official in 
the capital that, out of reports from the borders, had to closely observe the 
situation in neighbouring enemy peoples, keep an eye on them, learn and 
report.4 This duty in the tenth century was assigned to a representative of 
the emperor, often the Eparch of the City, that is, the highest Byzantine 
official in the capital, second only to the emperor,5 which underscores the 
importance of the analysis of information. Similarly, ordinary verbal forms 
meaning ‘to observe’ (diaskopein)6 or ‘to see’ (theasasthai)7 or ‘to search and 
assess’(diagnonai)8 and ‘search and find out’(diereunesai)9 were used in order to 
describe the spies’ activities. Sometimes, the terms implied the means, as in 
                                                     
2  Demetrakos, Mega lexicon tès Hellenikès Glossès [Great Dictionary of the Greek 
Language] (Athens 1953) s.v. ‘kataskopè’.  
3 H.S. Jones and J.E. Powel ed., Thucydides, Historiae VI (Oxford 1963) 34, 46. 
4 J.F. Haldon, Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions, 
Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae (hereafter CFHB) (Vienna 1990) 86. 
5 A. Kazhdan, ‘Eparch of the City’ in: A. Kazhdan et al. ed., Oxford Dictionary of 
Byzantium (Oxford and New York, NY 1991). 
6  G. Dagron and H. Mihaescu, Le traité sur la guérilla (de velitatione) de l’empereur 
Nicéphore Phocas (963-969) VI (Paris 1986) 13, 39. 
7 Ibidem, 12, 49. 
8 E. McGeer, ‘The Praecepta Militaria of the Emperor Nikephoros II Phocas’ in: E. 
McGeer ed., Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century IV 
Dumbarton Oaks Studies XXXIII (Washington, DC 1995) 40. 
9 ‘Leonis Imperatoris Tactica’ in: J.P. Migne ed., Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca 
(PG) 107 (Paris 1863) 670-1094, Appendix 1095-1120, especially 777A.  




the case of the word diopteusomenon,10 which meant ‘to find out by observing 
with one’s own eyes’.11 They alluded to a particular duty in gathering or 
checking a specific piece of information as in the expression ‘to find out in 
precise detail’ (diereunesai en akribeia) used by the early ninth century Chronicle 
of Theophanes describing an earlier Byzantine spy mission to Syria which took 
place under cover of a diplomatic one. The diplomatic mission in question 
was headed by Daniel Sinopites, Eparch of Constantinople at the time. The 
emperor, acting on the information received from Daniel about the Arabs 
preparing for war, made his own preparations assuming the possibility of a 
three-year siege of his capital. He built up the strength of his navy, repaired 
the walls and took care of the provisioning of the capital and its 
population.12 
Terms as the ones cited above underscore the agent’s duty to verify 
the information personally. Accuracy (akribeia) was the operative word in 
espionage. Procopius, the sixth century historian who described the wars of 
Justinian I, defined in his Secret History the work of spies in the context of 
the Persian-Byzantine conflict. He pointed out that the spies were in the 
service of the Empire and were paid by the Empire’s treasury in order to go 
to enemy lands. They went to Persia, gained access (in the guise of 
merchants or in any other way) to the king’s palace and learned accurately 
(es to akribes) the secrets of the enemy,13 so that, coming back to Byzantium, 
they reported to their leaders. Their numbers could include naval officers, 
who, under orders from the admiral of the fleet, used fast ships (dromones) to 
seek information on the enemy’s coastal defences or naval war preparations. 
They also used merchantmen and small fishing vessels of the myoparon type 
(single banked and with a single mast) in order to enter enemy ports.14 The 
common name of such ships in Greek and Latin kataskopos naus/speculatoris 
                                                     
10 C. de Boor ed., Theophanis Chronographia (Leipzig 1883-1885) 384/1-5. 
11 N. Koutrakou, ‘Diplomacy and Espionage: their role in Byzantine Foreign 
Relations, 8th-10th Centuries’, Graeco-Arabica 6 (1995) 125-144, especially 144. 
12 Theophanis Chronographia, 384/6-14. 
13 K.W. Dindorf ed., Procopii Caesariensis Historia Arcana 30 in: Corpus Scriptorum 
Historiae Byzantinae (hereafter CSHB ) (Bonn 1838) 163/3-8. 
14 A Late Antique mosaic at the Bardo Museum of Tunis represents such a small 
merchant/fishing ship. It bears the self-explanatory inscription CATASCOPISCUS. 
See: A. Berkaoui, ‘La Tunisie et l’art de la navigation dans l’Antiquité’ in: Ministère 
de la Culture/Agence Nationale du Patrimoine/Institut National du Patrimoine 
Tunisien ed., Tunisie. Hommes et Monuments (Tunis 1996) 54. 




navis (scouting or spy ships)15 clearly refers to their espionage function. The 
ubiquitous word kataskopoi, spies, was also used as a technical term in 
military manuals,16 in parallel with terms of Latin origin such as speculatores, 
sculcatores,17 exploratores,18 ducatores, minsuratores and procursatores.19 All of them 
were used indiscriminately for intelligencers, commandos, scouts and guides 
reconnoitering ahead as well as agents gathering all types of information.  
Other similar terms such as the Byzantine Greek term synodikoi,20 
denoted information gathering agents operating as a group (from the Greek 
synodos, assembly) in a military context. Military manuals used technical 
terms such as trapezitai, (from trapeza, banc, but also fortified borough) 
honsiarioi (from a Bulgarian word for brigands) and tasinarioi/tasinaria (from 
the Armenian tasn, ten)21 which pointed towards small specialist groups of 
about ten people, often coming from frontier regions. They operated in a 
local context, harassing the enemy and securing information about his 
movements.  
Another term, the viglai, also of Latin origin (from Latin vigilia), was 
likewise widely used in the context of in situ information gathering and 
reporting to the regional commander or to a centralised authority.22 The 
                                                     
15 V. Christides, ‘Military Intelligence in Arabo-byzantine Naval Warfare’ in: K. 
Tsiknakis ed., Byzantium at War 9th-12th in: The National Hellenic Research 
Foundation, Institute for Byzantine Research, International Symposia 4 (Athens 
1997) 269-281, especially 275-277. 
16 Leonis Imperatoris Tactica, 837D, 844B. Another military manual, the eleventh 
century Strategikon of Kekaumenos, used the word kataskopoi in parallel with the word 
topodetes, literally ‘those who observe the places’: W. Wassiliewski and V. Jernstedt, 
Cecaumeni Strategicon et incerti scriptoris de officiis regiis libellus (Amsterdam 1965 [oorspr. 
1896]) 26. 
17 The term is made explicit in the popular military manual attributed to emperor 
Maurice and written around 600AD, which gives the equation sculcatores=kataskopoi, 
thus suggesting that by that time Latin terms needed an explanation in the Greek-
speaking Eastern military milieu: G.T. Dennis ed., Das Strategikon des Maurikios, 
CFHB (Vienna 1981) 2, par. 11, 130. 
18  Leonis Imperatoris Tactica, 940A. Similarly, this late ninth – early tenth century 
military manual explains the term exploratores by its Greek equivalent kataskopoi. 
19 McGeer, ‘Praecepta Militaria’ 5, par. 2, 52 and McGeer, ‘Praecepta Militaria’ 4, 
par. 94, 44. 
20 Wassiliewski and Jenrnstedt, Cecaumeni Strategicon, 9/13-15. 
21 Dagron and Mihaescu, De velitatione, 252-257. 
22 Haldon, Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Three Treatises, 84. 




term referred mostly to look-outs, guards, watchmen, scouts and any person 
charged with the duty of watching out against an enemy threat and 
informing on it. The term viglai as well as several related terms such as 
viglatores, caminoviglia/caminovigla and caminoviglatores had a strong defensive 
connotation connected to counter-espionage. The viglai secured the roads 
and forwarded information either by means of the Byzantine semaphore 
system as seems to be indicated,23 especially by the term caminoviglia,24 or by 
courier messengers.  The use of signalling fires at specific locations enabled 
messages originating at the borders (in particular warnings about eminent 
enemy raids) to reach Constantinople in a matter of hours. It was a kind of 
Early Warning System that in the Eastern provinces began at the mountains 
of Cilicia in South Eastern Asia Minor and ended at the Church of the 
Virgin of the Pharos (Lighthouse) in Constantinople. 25 The illustrated 
manuscript of the History of Scylitzes, kept today at the Madrid National 
Library provides us with an illustration of the system (see fig. 1).  In the 
relevant miniature, Byzantine emperor Michael III (842-867) appears 
driving his chariot in the Hippodrome while the fires at the Virgin of the 
Pharos (depicted as a church on fire by the miniaturist) signaled an Arab 
attack. The purpose of the story was, as per later propaganda, to blacken the 
image of that emperor and present Michael III as an irresponsible ruler who 
continued to amuse himself instead of dealing with the affairs of the State.26 
However, the incident demonstrates that the semaphore system worked and 
its signals were clearly visible in Constantinople. Still the information that 
could be forwarded through this system was rudimentary at best and highly 
                                                     
23 According to Demetrakos, Mega Lexikon s.v. ‘kaminoviglia’, the word derives 
from the Latin word caminus (fireplace), denoting the watchmen/scouts/agents who 
used fire signals in order to pass the information along. Another etymology links 
the words caminoviglia/caminovigla, caminoviglatores to the late-Latin word caminus (road), 
in which case the agents would be the guardsmen and sentries along the roads, who, 
however, also signalled information about enemy movements. See the analysis by 
Dagron and Mihaescu, De velitatione, 216, 246-247. 
24 Dagron and Mihaescu, De velitatione, 2, 1-3, 39-40. 
25 P. Pattenden, ‘The Byzantine Early Warning System’, Byzantion 53 (1983) 258-299, 
especially 268-270. 
26  On the deliberate attacks on Michael III’s character by later historiography, 
which have been remarked upon by many scholars, see: R.J. Lilie, ‘Reality and 
Invention, Reflections on Byzantine Historiography’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 68 
(2014) 157-210, especially 172-173. 




dependent on weather conditions. These inefficiencies meant that in 




Fig. 1: The Byzantine Semaphore system. Source: A. Grabar and M. 
Manousakas, L’illustration du Manuscrit de Skylitzes de la Bibliothèque 
Nationale de Madrid, fol. 77v. Institut Hellénique d’Études Byzantines 
et Post-Byzantines de Venise (Venice 1979) fig. 79. 
 
Part of this system was the post service and its agents, cursores/procursores, as 
well as the agentes in rebus (active in affairs), magistrianoi/diatrehontes that is the 
imperial agents charged with various duties.27  They were acting as security 
agents, ensuring the surveillance of ports and customs, carrying off 
dispatches, gathering information and carrying out missions, often sensitive, 
inside the empire and beyond. They reported to the Magister Officiorum 
during the first Christian centuries and to the Droungarios tès Viglas,28 that is 
                                                     
27  ‘Alphabetical Guide’, G.W. Bowersock, P. Brown and O. Grabar ed., Late 
Antiquity: A guide to the Post-classical World (Cambridge, MA 1999) 278. 
28 N. Oikonomidès, Les listes de préséance byzantines des IXe et Xes siècles (Paris 1972) 
331-332. 




the person responsible for the security of the emperor and the City and/or 
to the Logothetes tou Dromos,29 that is the high official responsible for the oxys 
dromos/cursus publicus (post service), and for Byzantium’s foreign relations 
from the eighth century onwards. The information they provided was 
included in the espionage reports that reached the emperor. Not 
surprisingly, agents of this type, operating both inside the Empire and in 
foreign lands, were already in Late Antiquity called ‘eyes of the emperor’.30 
This multitude of terms for Byzantine intelligencers explains why 
the sources use the words ‘real spies’, aletheis kataskopoi  for those trained 
observers sent with the precise duty of verifying information in contrast to 
watchmen, scouts and commandos, although the latter could also act as ‘real 
spies’. These ‘real spies’ operated in principle in foreign lands and were 
charged with finding out accurate information, especially about enemy war 
preparations,31 city defences or political developments, using sympathisers’ 
networks. The story of emperor Constantine V (741-775) who was apprised 
by his kryptoi filoi (secret friends, as the chronicle of Theophanes called them) of 
the Bulgarian plans,32 hints at the existence not only of Byzantine influence 
in Bulgaria’s leading circles but rather of a spy network passing information 
to Byzantium.33 
However, operatives inside the Empire were also possible in the 
context of political struggles. Historian Ammianus Marcellinus relates a 
relevant incident while describing the revolt of Procopius, cousin and 
reputed designated successor to the emperor Julian (361-363). Procopius 
the usurper hid in Constantinople before instigating his revolt against 
emperor Valens in 365AD. In disguise, he went to Byzantium’s marketplace 
in order to collect rumours and assess the people’s feelings in view of a 
revolt. In this he acted, as Ammianus Marcellinus pointed out, ‘ritu itaque 
sollertisimi cuiusdam speculatoris’: as a most diligent spy.34 
 
                                                     
29 Ibidem, 312. 
30 Libanius, Orationes, in: R. Foerster ed., Libanii Opera (Leipzig 1903-1908) 18, 140. 
31 Leonis Imperatoris Tactica, 980C-D. 
32 de Boor, Theophanis Chronographia, 447/11.  
33  E. Kyriakes, Byzantio kai Boulgaroi (7os-10s ai). Symbolè stin exoterikè politikè toy 
Byzantioy [Byzantium and the Bulgarians 7th-10th Centuries. A Contribution on 
Byzantine Foreign Policy] (Athens 1993) 90. 
34 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXVI/6, 6 in: G. Viansino ed., Ammiano Marcellino, Storie 
III (Milan 2002) 134. 





Spy Stories and Espionage Awareness 
 
As far as the perception of espionage was concerned, the Byzantines did not 
concern themselves with the existence of Byzantine spies and commandos. 
However, both population and authorities at regional and central level were 
aware of and worried about the presence of enemy spies and tried to 
counter their activities. Information concerning popular perception abounds 
not only in histories and chronicles but also in the arguably most popular 
and widespread Byzantine literature, namely the hagiographical texts. 35 
Hagiography often provides relevant examples. The story of a saint, usually 
a wandering monk, arrested as a spy came to be almost commonplace in 
middle-Byzantine hagiography, especially in the context of Arab-Byzantine 
relations. Michael Psellos the eleventh century Byzantine scholar and 
Statesman, mentions in his letters a certain Elias monk, 36  a friend and 
servant of his, who had travelled widely across Byzantine lands as well as to 
Syria, had firsthand knowledge of the region and could reliably inform 
                                                     
35 L. Bréhier, ‘L’hagiographie byzantine des VIIIe et IXe siècles à Constantinople et 
dans les provinces’, Journal des Savants 14 (1916) 358-369. Similarly: H. Delehaye, 
‘L’ancienne hagiographie byzantine. Les sources, les premiers modèles, la formation 
des genres. Conférences prononcées au Collège de France en 1935. Textes inédits 
publiés par B. Joassart et X. Lequeux, préface de G. Dagron’, Subsidia Hagiographica 
73 (Brussels 1991) XXXVII-77; F. Halkin, ‘L’hagiographie Byzantine au service de 
l’histoire’ in: J.M. Hussey ed., Proceedings of the XIIIth International Congress of Byzantine 
Studies (Oxford, London and New York, NY 1966-1967) 345-354; as well as several 
authors in S. Efthymiadis ed., The Ashgate Research Companion to Byzantine Hagiography 
I, Periods and Places (Farnham 2011), all stressed the popularity of hagiography while 
analyzing its importance as a source of historical material. Recent research focused 
on hagiography’s role in reaching its readers: C. Rapp, ‘Figures of Female Sanctity: 
Byzantine Edifying Manuscripts and their Audience’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 50 
(1996) 313-344, especially 313. On its use as a tool for a message to reach the 
reader: N. Koutrakou, La propagande impériale byzantine, persuasion et réaction (VIIIe -Xe 
siècles) (Athens 1994) 152-157; and most recently: A. Timotin, ‘Message traditionnel 
et message immédiat dans l’hagiographie méso-byzantine IXe- XIe siècles’ in: P. 
Odorico ed., La face cachée de l’hagiographie byzantine. Le texte en tant que message immédiat. 
Actes du colloque international, Paris 5-7 juin 2008 (Paris 2012) 265-274. 
36 G. Dennis, ‘Elias the Monk, friend of Psellos’ in: J. Nesvitt ed., Byzantine Authors, 
Literary Activities and Preoccupations. Texts and Translations dedicated to the Memory of 
Nicholas Oikonomides (Leiden and Boston, MA 2003) 43-62. 




Psellos on events in the Eastern provinces of the Empire and beyond. 
Judging by this, the possibility of monks acting as information gatherers, if 
not spies, remained very real. 
 Similarly, the Life of St. Basil the Younger describes how the saint was 
mistaken for a spy at the time of emperor Leon VI (886-912): some 
magistianoi (imperial agents) passing through the saint’s region in Asia Minor 
on an unspecified mission, happened to meet him while taking a shortcut 
through the mountains. The saint’s rather strange appearance (according to 
the Acta Sanctorum version of the Life he was wearing a hermit’s woollen 
garments) did not inspire confidence in the imperial agents as to his 
intentions, so he was arrested and swiftly led in chains - using the imperial 
post service according to the Acta Sanctorum version - directly to the 
capital.37 The text does not provide many details about the arrest. However, 
the terms magistrianos and explorator used for those making the arrest suggest 
a reconnaissance mission through a mountain passage, probably in 
preparation of a Byzantine expedition. Any encounter during such a mission 
could be suspect. This is further substantiated as the text proceeds with the 
story of the saint in Constantinople. He was brought to the house of 
Samonas the patrician, a Byzantine official of Arab origin and one of 
emperor Leo VI’s most trusted collaborators. Consequently the saint was 
interrogated by Samonas himself.  Samonas often acted as a go-between in 
sensitive negotiations involving Arabs and Byzantine defectors. His 
activities caused him to be depicted in a less than favourable light in 
Byzantine chronicles.38 So, the fact that Samonas is presented in the Life as 
                                                     
37 Greek text in: D.F. Sullivan, A.M. Talbot and S. McGarth, The Life of St. Basil the 
Younger. Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of the Moscow Version. Dumbarton 
Oaks Studies 45 (Washington, DC 2014) 70; Version in Latin: J. Bollandus, G. 
Henschenius, D. Paperbrochius ed., ‘De S. Basilio Iuniore anachoreta 
Constantinopoli = Vita S. Basilii Iunioris’ in: Acta Sanctorum Martii III (Antwerpen 
1668) 667-681, especially par. 2, 668. 
38 Samonas’s feud with powerful Byzantine aristocratic families and factions such as 
the Argyroi and the Doukai, did not earn him any friends. He is described in 
Byzantine chronicles as trying to flee to Arab lands, as entering in secret 
negotiations with the Arabs and engineering the defection and downfall of 
Andronic Doukas, as involved in the forced retirement of patriarch Nicholas I of 
Constantinople: in short as a rather ‘shady’ figure of the early tenth century 
Byzantine politics. See Theophanes Continuatus in Scriptores post Theophanem in: 
I. Bekker ed., Theophanes Continuatus, Ioannes Cameniata, Symeon Magister, Georgius 




personally conducting the interrogation and asking the saint questions 
aiming at identifying him suggests several things.39 First that Samonas was a 
known factor in the context of information gathering and processing, 
possibly acting as the Byzantine ‘spymaster’ in Arab matters. Second that 
there was a series of identifying details without which anyone could be 
suspected of espionage. The identifying elements asked of the saint 
concerned his name, origins and the purpose of his being where he was 
apprehended. The ensuing dialog in the hagiographical text is one of a 
continuous double entente, with Samonas asking realistic questions and 
even stating that the saint was arrested on a charge of espionage against the 
land of the Romans (= the Byzantines) and the saint either remaining silent 
or answering metaphorically that he was a stranger not to a country or town 
but to mortal life. The Life follows in this instance the hagiographical topos 
of confrontation between the saint-hero and the tyrant. Samonas assumes 
the role of the latter and orders St. Basil to be imprisoned and tortured.40 
Finally, the saint is miraculously saved from death by drowning ordered by 
Samonas and goes on with his life in Constantinople.  
Such identification-aimed questions were often put to lone travellers 
in Byzantine lands. Several hagiographical texts relating the deeds of 
Byzantine saints mention their being viewed with suspicion by Byzantine 
authorities and having to identify themselves, by answering the ‘usual 
questions’. For instance, the Life of St. Luke the Younger, a tenth century saint, 
states that while travelling through mainland Greece the saint was (falsely) 
accused of being an escaped slave and arrested. He had to answer the ‘usual 
questions’ about his birth, parents, family, origin and destination and was 
freed only after identification by a reliable witness.41 The accusation might 
be a pretext but at any rate it gave the road patrol that stopped the saint the 
opportunity to control a suspected traveller. According to the testimony of 
another travelling saint, Gregory Decapolites, an identification document, a 
                                                                                                                       
Monachus in: CSHB (Bonn 1838) 368-377; R.J.H. Jenkins, ‘The “Flight” of Samonas’, 
Speculum 23 (1948) 217-235. 
39 Sullivan et al., The Life of St. Basil the Younger, 72; Vita S. Basillii Iunioris, par. 3, 668. 
40 Sullivan et al., The Life of St. Basil the Younger, 74-78; Vita S. Basillii Iunioris, par. 4-5, 
668-669. 
41 D. Sophianos ed., The Life of St. Luke the Steiriotes (Athens 1989) 15/5, 165-166. 




kind of ‘mission order’ was often needed in order to pass such road 
controls.42 
  It is interesting to note how often in Byzantine writings monks came 
under suspicion of being spies. After all they comprised one of the most 
mobile segments of society – the other ones being merchants, military men 
and army followers. They were able to travel as pilgrims, in search of a 
suitable place to become anchorites or for visits to other monastic 
communities or even as paid travelling guides for other travelers,43 both 
within and outside the Empire. With them travelled news, rumours and 
information. They could provide cover for spies or serve as spies 
themselves, hence the distrust and control of authorities and population. A 
number of stories, from the tenth century chronicles known as the 
Continuators of Theophanes and from hagiographical texts such as Life of St. 
Gregory the Decapolites, or the Italo-Greek Life of St. Nilos the Younger, illustrate 
this point. 
The Chronicles state that emperor Theophilos (829-842) wanted to 
recall to Byzantium a defector, a general named Manuel who, under 
suspicion of conspiracy, had sought refuge with the Arabs.  At the time of 
the chronicler, more than a century after the events, there were several 
stories circulating as to how the emperor succeeded in doing so. According 
to one version he sent to Baghdad John the Grammarian, a ninth century 
intellectual monk who later became the last Iconoclast patriarch, 44 
ostensibly to negotiate an exchange of prisoners, but with the covert 
mission of finding Manuel and passing to him the emperor’s letter of safe-
conduct, so that he could return to Constantinople. Another version had 
John infiltrating Baghdad amidst visiting Iberian monks. There, disguised as 
a mendicant, he made contact with Manuel on pretext of asking for alms 
and passed him the safe-conduct letter which enabled the general to come 
back to the Byzantine side.45 These stories have all the trappings of fiction: 
disguises, subterfuges, undercover intelligencers, even a ‘happy end’ for the 
                                                     
42 G. Makris ed., Ignatios Diakonos und die Vita des Hl. Gregorios Dekapolites. 
Byzantinisches Archiv 17 (Stuttgart and Leipzig 1997)  par. 49, 110. 
43 H. Delehaye ed., ‘Vita S. Pauli Junioris in Monte Latro’, Analecta Bollandiana 11 
(1892) 5-74 and 136-182, especially 22. 
44 P. Lemerle, Le premier humanisme byzantin (Paris 1971) 135-137. Also: L. Bréhier, 
‘Un patriarche sorcier à Constantinople’, Revue de l’Orient Chrétien 9 (1904) 261-268. 
45 I. Bekker ed., Theophanes Continuatus, Ioannes Cameniata, Symeon Magister, Georgius 
Monachus, CSHB (Bonn 1838) 119-120. 




Byzantine side. They probably belonged to a collection of such anecdotes 
circulating about the rather controversial figure of John the Grammarian 
both by his iconoclast supporters and his iconophile detractors. However, 
the fact that such stories were in circulation indicates that authorities and 
population in Byzantium and in Arab lands were aware that visiting monks 
could be spies in disguise and reacted accordingly. 
In the Life of St. Gregory the Decapolites the popular reaction took on a 
rather extreme form. The saint was in the Southern Italian city of Otranto 
where he became the object of what amounted to a citizens’ arrest of the 
time: he was accused by the mob of being a traitor to the Christian 
population, suffered the humiliation of being paraded with a soudarion, (a 
kind of oriental head-dress) and threatened with death.46 He was saved only 
through the intervention of the iconoclast bishop of Otranto. The particular 
form of the humiliation suffered by the saint suggests either a will to 
proclaim him a defender of images, an enemy-traitor to be compared to the 
external Arab enemy, or a will to demonstrate that the mob had 
apprehended an Arab spy,47 – something of particular importance to the city 
of Otranto at a time when the Arab naval raids in the region were quite 
common.48 According to his Life, something similar happened to another 
Byzantine wandering monk, the Sicilian St. Elias the Younger, while 
travelling with a disciple of his from Sparta to Italy around 880/881 AD. 
When the travellers reached the city of Buthrinto in the Epirus Vetus region, 
opposite the island of Corfu, they found themselves under investigation by 
the local authorities. The local deputy military commander called them 
‘impious Agarenes’ and accused them of being kataskopoi ton poleon (spies of 
                                                     
46 Makris, Gregorios Dekapolites, par. 33/5-7, 96-98. 
47 C. Mango, ‘On re-reading the Life of St Gregory the Decapolite’, Byzantina 13 
(1985) 633-646, especially 637. 
48 Saracen raids, echoing the dangers of the time, are a recurrent Leitmotiv in 
Byzantine hagiographical texts from Southern Italy: E. Follieri, ‘Il culto dei santi 
nell’Italia greca’ in: La chiesa greca in Italia dal VIII al XVI secolo: atti del convegno storico 
interecclesiale, Bari 30.04.–04.05.1969 II. Italia sacra 21 (Padua 1972) 553–577, 
especially 564–565 and 569–570. Also: S. Efthymiades, ‘Les saints d’Italie 
méridionale (IXe–XIIe s.) et leur rôle dans la société locale’ in: D. Sullivan, E. 
Fisher and S. Papaioannou ed., Byzantine Religious Culture: Studies in Honor of Alice-
Mary Talbot (Leiden and Boston, MA 2012) 347–372, especially 349, 365. On the 
narrative motifs of hagiographical texts from Southern Italy see: M. Re, ‘Italo-
Greek Hagiography’ in: S. Efthymiadis ed., The Ashgate Research Companion to 
Byzantine Hagiography, I: Periods and Places (Farnham 2011) 227–258, especially 238ff. 




towns).49 The specific accusation indirectly provides us with a glimpse as to 
the targets of espionage at the time: information on coastal towns and port 
fortifications were of prime importance in the context of the Arabbyzantine 
naval conflicts in the region. It also underlines that it was quite easy to 
accuse someone of espionage, especially a stranger without links to the 
region. 
This awareness of the possibility of foreigners to be spies in 
disguise was not limited to the Byzantine side. Byzantine texts refer to 
Christian pilgrims apprehended as spies by Saracens in the Holy Land. A 
rather curious text, a Passio of the 63 martyrs of Jerusalem in the year 724AD, 
possibly written around the mid-eighth century50 describes the martyrs’ fate. 
According to this text,51 they went on a pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre. 
They also transported a quantity of gold, silver and other offerings for the 
Christian shrines in Palestine and for the monks residing in the region,52 a 
fact that suggests a possible trade mission. There they were arrested by the 
Arab ‘sentries of the roads’,53 (a function similar to the counter-espionage 
Byzantine one), accused of espionage, tried and put to death.54 
The above stories denote an awareness and fear of espionage in 
encounters with foreigners. The fact that spies and scouts dressed in a 
similar fashion and could often pass for natives of the other side did 
nothing to alleviate that fear. For instance, the aforementioned St. Gregory 
the Decapolites, leaving the city of Otranto, happened by pure chance, 
according to his Life, to find himself in the middle of the nearby Arab army. 
However he was able to go through them without being challenged.55 This 
is rather significant – if not suspect. It means that he could pass for Arab – 
and if the Arab invading army was that close to the city of Otranto, then the 
inhabitants were rightly suspicious of foreigners.  
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Another Byzantine hagiographical text, the Life of St. Nilos the 
Younger confirms the importance of disguising a spy’s appearance, which 
caused troubles for Byzantine wandering monks and pilgrims. St. Nilos 
resided at the forested region of Mercourion, in Southern Italy, when a 
Saracen raid took place and his companion monks were taken prisoners. 
The saint decided to partake of their fate in order to offer them consolation. 
So, he waited on the road for a Saracen raiding party to take him prisoner.56 
Sometime afterwards a company of about ten cavalrymen dressed and 
armed as Saracens came towards him. The saint expected to be taken 
prisoner but they asked him to pray for them. They removed their Saracen 
head-dresses and the saint became aware that they were Byzantine soldiers 
from a nearby fortress who, as they said, had put on this disguise, in order 
to ‘aposkopisai ton topon’ (spy/scout the region). 57  The story provides an 
independent witness as to how the synodikoi/tasinarioi,58 the small specialist 
spying/scout groups described in the military manuals, really operated. At 
the same time, it corroborates the difficulty for the population to distinguish 
between friendly and hostile spies, a fact which added to the perception of 
spies as a military necessity but pushed the public awareness of the danger 
of espionage almost to the point of paranoia. 
 
 
The Byzantine ‘Spymaster’ and the Espionage System 
 
Judging by the above spy stories, the espionage terminology of the military 
sources is not found in other sources. This is hardly surprising given the 
technical and practical character of military manuals and the ignorance of 
such terms by most hagiographers. What the stories, despite their often 
fictional character underline, is the high awareness of the Byzantine 
authorities and population as to the existence of enemy spies. Byzantine 
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spies however were taken for granted and not much spoken about. Also, 
with the exception of military manuals which were of restricted readership, 
there was much confusion as to what the various types of spies and 
commandos were required to do. The hagiographical texts provide useful 
information as to the perception of spies, but only hint at their organisation. 
The overall picture points towards a twofold system functioning both at 
regional and central level. The regional one concentrated on enemy 
preparations and movements and used mostly small units of army specialists, 
as the military terms indicate. Possibly the men came from border regions, 
from the trapezae, the fortified boroughs of the borderlands and were 
bilingual. Their reports were mostly circumstantial and depended on sources 
ranging from reconnaissance, interrogation of captives and conversion of 
captives to spies though use of threats and holding family as hostages. Local 
merchants, pilgrims and non-combatant followers of armies who came into 
contact with local populations were also sources of information. The spies 
were accountable to the commanding officer of an expedition or to the 
general of the Byzantine theme, the Byzantine provincial administration unit. 
It was the duty of the provincial military governor or the commander of an 
expedition to evaluate the information provided by spies and either act 
upon it or forward it to the capital to be included into a larger picture. The 
latter action concerned in particular specific information possibly brought 
to the regional commander through the ‘real spies’ operating in foreign 
lands and had to reach the capital through trusted messengers, probably 
together with reports on the internal situation.  
Once in the capital, such information would be checked against 
elements provided by other means, including diplomatic reports and special 
missions. The sources are not exactly clear as to who had the duty to 
evaluate all the information and provide a comprehensive report which 
eventually reached the emperor. There was a large body of trusted 
secretaries. Psellos, who began his career as an asecretis (an imperial secretary) 
has provided us with a vivid picture of their working (and overworking) 
conditions.59 Similarly, the De Administrando imperio, a Byzantine treatise on 
kingcraft and foreign policy which was composed specifically for the use of 
an heir to the empire in the mid-tenth century, indicates by the use of the 
word Isteon (it should be known/noted) at the beginning of several chapters 
that it was composed using data files from every branch of the imperial 
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administration.60 Such fact sheets could be drawn out from more extensive 
reports, including espionage ones, although the sources do not mention the 
person(s) charged with providing the synthesised report that would reach its 
ultimate destination: the emperor.  
However, one or more high officials, acting essentially as 
Byzantium’s ‘spymaster(s)’, would build a comprehensive picture and 
provide the emperor with alternatives for him to assess and give the order 
to act. For Constantinople the official in question was, in all probability, the 
droungarios tis viglas, who, as the term indicates, was charged with countering 
threats to the capital and to the emperor himself. Another likely candidate 
was the Eparch of the City, the highest administrative authority in 
Constantinople after the emperor. Lastly, the Logothetes tou Dromou, from the 
eighth century onwards, as head of the cursus publicus (post service) and 
responsible for the interpreters and the foreign envoys in Byzantine lands 
also had the possibility to act as ‘spymaster’. The historian Procopius’ 
treatment of the cursus publicus and spies/kataskopoi together in his Secret 
History confirms their interrelationship.61 Procopius’ purpose was to damage 
Justinian’s imperial image by accusing him of reducing the ‘oxys dromos’ the 
velocity and frequency of the post service and thus the passing of 
information from the frontiers to the capital. He also asserted that Justinian, 
out of avarice stopped the spies’ stipend. Thus Justinian deprived the 
Empire of information as to the Persian war preparations, indirectly 
becoming the cause of losing the Lasica region to them.62  The story, despite 
Procopius’ malign intentions, reflects the perception of spies as a military 
necessity and of the link between espionage and communications, indirectly 
confirming the power of the official supervising such services. 
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An interesting story from the Byzantine Chronicles illustrates the 
power such an official could yield in the tenth century. 63  It concerns a 
certain Nicholas, former tax collector, who, accused of peculation, had fled 
to Syria – presumably with the proceedings from the taxes. During the 
rebellion or Constantine Doukas in 913 AD, 64  this Nicholas sent to 
Constantinople, for the attention of Thomas the Logothetes a message written 
in invisible ink on a black cloth. He advised not to fear the rebel, because 
his rebellion was not thought through and would fail. The message was 
coded as a kind of prophecy, reducing the danger of its being understood if 
intercepted. It was written in Arabic and the interpreter of Arabic 
deciphered and interpreted it. The message essentially apprised the Logothetes 
as to the Arab stance in the case: the Arabs would remain neutral 
withdrawing their support from Doukas and diminishing his chances of 
success.  
 In the above case the Logothetes Thomas acted both as responsible 
for foreign relations and for security matters. Informed of the Arabs’ 
intentions he could avoid international complications and proceed with 
crushing the rebellion. The story in fact points to him as being the 
Byzantine spymaster by implication: Nicholas knew the code in which to 
write the message and addressed it specifically to him. This means that 
probably Nicholas was himself part of the Byzantine espionage system; a 
planted spy who had gained his place among the Arabs by simulating a 
defection. 
However, although the Logothetes tou Dromou, as per his 
competences was the best candidate for ‘spymaster’, it should be clear that 
this was not a particular office. It was a function and it could be exercised 
by different officials, depending on personalities and circumstances. One 
condition, as in the case of Samonas, was absolutely necessary: The official 
in question had to enjoy the absolute trust of the emperor, the ultimate 
                                                     
63 Theophanes Continuatus, 383-384; F. Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence services: The ancient 
Near East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the Arab Muslim Empires, the Mongol Empire, 
China, Moscovy (New Brunswick, NJ 1974) 148-149. 
64 For the revolt of Constantine Doukas see: K. Bourdara, Kathosiosis kai Tyrannis 
kata tous mesous byzantinous chronous. Makekonikè Dynasteia (867-1056) [Conspiracy and 
Usurpation during the middle-Byzantine period. The Macedonian Dynasty (867-
1056)] (Athens-Komotene 1981) 55-59; K. Bourdara, Kathosiosis kai Tyrannis…To 
politico adikema sto Byzantio (8os-13os aionas) [Conspiracy and Usurpation…The 
political crime in Byzantium (8th-13th century)] (Athens 2015) 195-199. 




decision maker in the Byzantine espionage system, who, sometimes acted as 
‘spymaster’ himself. In fact, Procopius credited with this role empress 
Theodora, who, allegedly, maintained her own spy network and was thus 
informed not only of what was said in public marketplaces but also of what 
transpired in everyone’s house.65 Her agents could also perform police and 
commando operations on her orders. In other words, she operated outside 
normal channels and as empress, she could afford it. 
Also, competition among the various services dealing with Byzantine 
espionage and counter-espionage cannot be ruled out. Could, for instance, 
this kind of competition have fueled, among other differences, the enmity 
between Samonas and general Eustathios Argyros, Droungarios tès Viglas at 
that time? It is possible that Samonas was no stranger to Argyros’ downfall 
upon suspicion of conspiracy, his replacement as Drougarios tès viglas and his 
subsequent exile.66 Byzantine espionage, as the above story of Nicholas tax 
collector demonstrates, was interwoven both with interior politics and 
foreign relations and the function of ‘spymaster’ was no sinecure. 
In conclusion, we should note that although the surviving sources 
do not allow for a detailed picture of the Byzantine espionage system at 
regional and central level (and their possible combination), one thing is 
certain: it existed and it functioned both offensively and defensively. 
Espionage was perceived as a military necessity and as a tool for political 
gain. For the Byzantine populations, especially frontier ones, enemy 
espionage was a phenomenon that was part of life. Byzantines were aware 
that espionage and counter-espionage could shape politics and wars, in 
other words could shape history, and in some cases it probably did. The fact 
that there remains scarce mention of espionage operations is a measure of 
their success. 
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